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We present a discretely modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution system in free space by
using strong coherent states. The amplitude noise in the laser source is suppressed to the shot-noise limit by
using a mode cleaner combined with a frequency shift technique. Also, it is proven that the phase noise in the
source has no impact on the final secret key rate. In order to increase the encoding rate, we use broadband
homodyne detectors and the no-switching protocol. In a realistic model, we establish a secret key rate of 46.8
kbits/s against collective attacks at an encoding rate of 10 MHz for a 90% channel loss when the modulation
variance is optimal.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD)
by using coherent states [1] was introduced as an alternative
to the single-photon-based discrete quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol [2]. In this protocol, two legitimate users
(Alice and Bob) use coherent states whose X and P quadra-
tures are Gaussian modulated to establish a shared secret key.
CV-QKD has made great achievements during the past few
years. At first, it was thought that no secret key rate could be
obtained when the channel loss was larger than 3 dB, subse-
quently, the 3-dB loss limit was beaten by the methods of re-
verse reconciliation [3] and was experimentally demonstrated
[4]. At the same time, another method called postselection [5]
was proposed, which can also beat the 3-dB loss limit. Just
like the discrete QKD protocol, at first, it was believed that
the security of CV-QKD was based on the random switch-
ing of bases that Bob measures. Subsequently, it was found
that, without switching, CV-QKD is also secure [6], and has
performed experimental demonstrations [7, 8]. Several exper-
iments of Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD with optical fibers
have been implemented [9–11]. However, the distance be-
tween Alice and Bob is much shorter than that in the discrete
QKD because the reconciliation efficiency of continuous vari-
ables is much lower than that of discrete variables when the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is small.
In order to adapt CV-QKD for long-distance communica-
tion, two CV-QKD protocols with discrete modulation were
proposed [12, 13], and the former was recently experimen-
tally implemented [14]. In these schemes, instead of Gaus-
sian modulation, Alice modulates the quadratures of coherent
states discretely. In the former protocol, Eve’s attacks were
restricted by tomography performed by Bob, whereas the lat-
ter offered unconditional proofs with no assumption. The se-
curity of the latter scheme is guaranteed by the optimality of
Gaussian attacks [15, 16], that is, when the covariance ma-
trix of the state shared by Alice and Bob is the same as in the
Gaussian modulated case, the secret key rate is also the same.
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However, discretely modulated CV-QKD is secure only when
the modulation variance is small. So the SNR in discretely
modulated CV-QKD is much smaller than that of the Gaus-
sian modulated CV-QKD experiments so far, which means
that the noise is more fatal in discretely modulated CV-QKD.
The noise in CV-QKD mainly consists of two parts, quantum
noise and classical noise. The former is induced by channel
loss and can not be suppressed; the latter is called excess noise
and can be arbitrarily suppressed in principle.
In this paper, we present an experimental implementation
of discretely modulated CV-QKD described in Ref.[13] in free
space. In order to increase the bandwidth of cryptography and
to remove the noise caused by imprecise control of the rela-
tive phase between the signal and the local oscillator (LO), we
use the no-switching protocol [6] instead of randomly switch-
ing the quadrature that Bob measures. Unlike Ref. [14], we
use strong coherent states instead of weak coherent states for
obtaining a sizable feedback signal to lock the relative phase.
Additionally, the amplitude noise in the laser source is sup-
pressed at the shot-noise limit by using a mode cleaner com-
bined with a frequency shift technique. Also, it is proven that
the phase noise in the source has no impact on the final secret
key rate. As a result, we establish a secret key rate of 46.8
kbits/s for a 90% lossy channel (which corresponds to a 50
km standard telecom fiber with a 0.2-dB/km loss) under the
realistic model [4].
II. THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF THE SECRET KEY
RATES
A. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we detail the calculation of the security
bound of discretely modulated CV-QKD under collective at-
tacks by considering the noise in the laser source.
When the noise in the source is not considered, the protocol
runs as follows [13]. (i) Alice prepares one of the four coher-
ent states: |αk〉 =
∣∣∣αei(2k+1)pi/4〉 with k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and sends
it to Bob. The real number α is chosen so as to maximize
the secret key rate. (ii)When Bob receives the state, he uses a
50:50 beamsplitter to split the state into two beams. Then he
2measures the X quadrature of one beam and the P quadrature
of the other. (iii) The signal of the modulated and measured
value encodes the bit of the raw key, so after Bob’s measure-
ment, he and Alice share correlated strings of bits. By recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification they can achieve secret key.
This is the prepare and measure version of the protocol. It is
easy to implement experimentally in this version, but difficult
to analyze theoretically. Usually the security is established
by considering the equivalent entanglement-based scheme. In
this scheme, Alice has a pure two-mode entanglement state
[13]
∣∣∣ΦAB0〉 = 12
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉A |αk〉B0 , (1)
where the states
|ψk〉 =
3∑
m=0
1
2
e−i(1+2k)mpi/4 |φm〉 (2)
are orthogonal with each other. The state |φm〉 is defined as
follows:
|φm〉 =
e−α
2/2
√
ξm
∞∑
n=0
α4n+m√(4n + m)! (−1)
n |4n + m〉 , (3)
where
ξ0,2 =
1
2 exp
(
−α2
) (
cosh
(
−α2
)
± cos
(
−α2
))
,
ξ1,3 =
1
2 exp
(
−α2
) (
sinh
(
−α2
)
± sin
(
−α2
))
.
(4)
Alice holds mode A and sends mode B0 to Bob. Then she
uses a set of projection operators |ψk〉 〈ψk | (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) to
measure the mode she keeps. If mode A collapses into |ψk〉,
then the mode sent to Bob collapses into |αk〉.
B. THE ENTANGLEMENT-BASED SCHEME FOR A
NOISY SOURCE
When the noise in the source is taken into account, things
are slightly different. In the prepare and measure scheme, due
to the noise in the laser source and the imperfection of mod-
ulation, the state Alice sends to Bob is not a pure state |αk〉,
instead it is a noisy mixed state ρkB0 Without loss of general-
ity, let us assume that the noise on the X quadrature and the P
quadrature have the same variance δε, and their mean values
are both zero. Also, we assume that the noise is induced by a
neutral person Fred, and the eavesdropper Eve can not benefit
from it.
In the equivalent entanglement-based scheme, as shown in
Fig.1, Fred has a pure three-mode entanglement state,
∣∣∣ΦAB0F〉 = 14
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉A
∣∣∣ϕkB0F
〉
, (5)
where
∣∣∣ϕkB0F
〉
satisfies trF
(∣∣∣ϕkB0F
〉 〈
ϕkB0F
∣∣∣) = ρkB0 . Fred keeps
mode F and sends modes A and B0 to Alice. Alice holds
FIG. 1: The entanglement-based scheme of discretely modulated
CV-QKD when considering the noise in the source. Bob uses het-
erodyne detection and it is assumed that Eve can not benefit from the
imperfection of Bob’s detector
mode A and sends mode B0 to Bob. Then, she uses a set of
projection operators |ψk〉 〈ψk | (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) to measure the
mode she keeps. If mode A collapses into |ψk〉, the mode sent
to Bob collapses into ρkB0 . On Bob’s side, we consider the
realistic model [4], in which Eve cannot benefit from the noise
added by Bob’s detector. In the entanglement-based scheme
we can simplify the description of the realistic detector on
Bob side [10]. As shown in Fig.1, the inefficiency of Bob’s
detector is modeled by a beam splitter with transmission η,
while the electronic noise υ of Bob’s detector is modeled by a
thermal state ρH0 with variance N, which enters the other input
port of the beam splitter. Then, Bob uses a perfect heterodyne
detector to measure state ρB′ . It is obvious to obtain that the
variance of the result of Bob’s measurement Vb is [17]
Vb =
η
2
VB +
1 − η
2
N +
1
2
, (6)
where VB is the variance of state ρB. Since the detector’s ef-
ficiency is η and the electronic noise is υ, we can also obtain
that
Vb = η
(
VB
2
+
1
2
)
+ (1 − η) + υ, (7)
so we can obtain N = 1 + 2υ/(1 − η). To consider the ther-
mal state ρH0 as the reduced state obtained from a two-mode
Gaussian state ρGH0 of variance N allows us to simplify the
calculations.
C. THE OPTIMALITY OF GAUSSIAN ATTACKS FOR A
NOISY SOURCE
In collective attacks, Eve uses an ancilla to interact with
each pulse that Alice sends to Bob. After the interaction, the
global state ρAB0F turns into ρABEF . On Bob’s side, before his
measurement, the received pulse interferes with the thermal
state ρH0 , and the global state becomes ρAB′EFGH Under col-
lective attacks, when Alice and Bob use reverse reconciliation
and the reconciliation efficiency is β, the secret key rate is [13]
K = βI(a : b) − χ(b : E), (8)
where a, b represent the classical data of Alice and Bob,
I(a : b) is the Shannon mutual information between a and
b, and χ(b : E) is the Holevo bound, an upper bound for
Eve’s accessible information. When considering both the
noisy source and the realistic detector, it is rather complicated
3to derive the information that Eve gets by using the method in-
troduced in Ref. [18], since the global state is an eight-mode
state. So, we do not derive the secret key rate directly. Instead,
we find a lower bound to K [19]
˜K = βI(a : b) − χ (b : EF) , (9)
and ˜K ≤ K always holds. It is obvious that when the noise in
the source is small, ˜K will be very close to K. Additionally,
when the source is noiseless, ˜K = K holds. The Holevo bound
χ (b : EF) is defined as
χ (b : EF) = S (ρEF ) −
∫
p(b)S
(
ρbEF
)
db, (10)
where p(b) is the probability of the result of Bob’s mea-
surement. Before Bob’s measurement, the global state is
ρABEF , so we obtain S (ρEF ) = S (ρAB). After Bob’s mea-
surement, the global state comes into ρbAEFGH , thus we have
S
(
ρbEF
)
= S
(
ρbAGH
)
.
Notice that state ρAB′GH is determined by state ρAB, so K
is a function of ρAB. According to the optimality of Gaussian
attacks [15, 16], for all the two-mode states ρAB with the same
covariance matrix, ˜K(ρAB) achieves the minimum value when
ρAB is Gaussian. In the following, instead of K, we will derive
its lower bound ˜K. When the channel’s transmittance is T0
and the excess noise is ε0, the variance matrix of ρAB is
γAB =
[ (VA + 1) I2 √T0ZσZ√
T0ZσZ [T0 (VA + ε0 + δε)] I2
]
, (11)
where Z = 2α2
(
ξ
3
2
0 ξ
− 12
1 + ξ
3
2
1 ξ
− 12
2 + ξ
3
2
2 ξ
− 12
3 + ξ
3
2
3 ξ
− 12
0
)
reflects
the correlation between mode A and mode B, VA = 2α2 is just
the modulation variance in the prepare and measure scheme,
I2 is a two-dimensional unit matrix and σz = diag (1,−1).
Then, we will represent the corresponding case in the Gaus-
sian modulated protocol. In this case, Alice modulates the
pure coherent states with Gaussian variables, whose vari-
ance is VA. Then she sends them to Bob via a channel
with transmittance T and excess noise ε. In the equivalent
entanglement-based scheme, the variance of ρAB is
γGAB =
[ (VA + 1) I2 √TZEPRσz√
TZEPRσz [T (VA + ε) + 1] I2
]
, (12)
where ZEPR =
√
V2A + 2VA [13]. The entanglement states
used in Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD are maximally corre-
lated, while those in discretely modulated CV-QKD are not,
so Z < ZEPR. To make γGAB equal to γAB, we get
T = T0
Z2
Z2EPR
, ε =
Z2EPR
Z2
(VA + ε0 + δε) − VA. (13)
According to the optimality of Gaussian attacks [15, 16], if
we use discrete modulation, when the modulation variance is
VA, the variance of the noise in the source is δε, the channel’s
transmittance is T0 and excess noise is ε0, the lower bound of
the secret key rate is just the same as the secret key rate of the
case in which Alice uses Gaussian modulation with variance
VA, and the channel’s transmittance and excess noise are given
by Eq. (13).
D. CALCULATION OF THE SECRET KEY RATE
We call χc = 1/T − 1 + ε the noise added by the channel,
and χd = 2(1 + υ)/η − 1 the noise induced by the heterodyne
detector. Then the total noise added between Alice and Bob is
χt = χc + χd/T . (14)
When Bob uses heterodyne detection, the mutual information
between Alice and Bob is [20, 21]
I (a : b) = log2
(
V + χt
χt + 1
)
, (15)
where V = VA + 1.
Then we will derive S (ρAB). Let α = V , β = T (V +χc), and
γ =
√
T (V2 − 1), the symplectic eigenvalues λ1, λ2 satisfy
λ21 + λ
2
2 = α
2 + β2 − 2γ2,
λ21λ
2
2 =
(
αβ − γ2
)2
.
(16)
So we obtain
λ1,2 =
√
1
2
(
A ±
√
A2 − 4B
)
, (17)
where A = α2+β2−2γ2 and B =
(
αβ − γ2
)2
. Thus the entropy
of ρAB is
S (ρAB) = g (λ1) + g (λ2) , (18)
where
g(x) = x + 1
2
log2
(
x + 1
2
)
− x − 1
2
log2
(
x − 1
2
)
. (19)
Let
C = [Aχ2d + 2α
(
αβ − γ2
)
χd + 2γ2 + B + 1] (β + χd)−2 ,
D =
(
α +
√
Bχd
)2 (β + χd)−2 ,
(20)
then the entropy of ρbAGH is [21]
S
(
ρbAGH
)
= g (λ3) + g (λ4) , (21)
where
λ3,4 =
√
1
2
(
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
)
. (22)
Since S
(
ρbAGH
)
is independent of Bob’s measurement b, we
obtain ∫
p(b)S
(
ρbAGH
)
db = S
(
ρ
b0
AGH
)
, (23)
where b0 is a constant.
So, in the discretely modulated CV-QKD, the lower bound
to the secret key rate is
˜K = β log2
(
V + χt
χt + 1
)
− g (λ1) − g (λ2) + g (λ3) + g (λ4) . (24)
It is enough to derive the lower bound of the secret key rate
against collective attacks, because they are proven to be the
most powerful attacks in the asymptotic limit [22, 23].
4FIG. 2: The experimental schematic of discretely modulated CV-
QKD. Laser, NP Photonics (1550 nm); RNG1,-2, random number
generators; HWP1C6, half-wave plates; PBS1C5, polarizesr; PZT,
piezoelectric transducer; QWP, quarter-wave plate; D1C4, detectors;
LPF, low-pass filter.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCRETELY MODULATED
CV-QKD
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The schematic of our experimental setup is shown in Fig.
2. The laser source is a 1550-nm continuous-wave fiber laser
(NP Photonics). The noise in the laser has been mainly sup-
pressed by a mode cleaner, which is a triangle resonant cavity
with a finesse of 500. Alice uses HWP1 and PBS1 to split a
small part of the light as the signal, and the rest as the LO. The
signal’s power is about 4µW, and the LO’s power is 40mW in
our experiment. Then, Alice mixes two random electronic sig-
nals with a 50-MHz carrier, and sends the outputs of the mix-
ers to amplitude and phase modulators to modulate the sig-
nal. Alice generates binary pseudorandom numbers by using a
programmable function generator (Agilent33250A)in our ex-
periment. Since the generation rate of random electronic sig-
nals on Alice’s side is 10MHz, the width of each coherent
state is 100ns. The LO and the signal are sent to Bob through
the quantum channel. We use HWP2 and PBS2 to replace the
lossy channel (no excess noise).
When Bob receives the signal that Alice sends, he splits it
into two beams with HWP3 and PBS3. At one of the output
ports of PBS3, he makes a homodyne detection and uses the
DC part of the result as a feedback signal to control the PZT,
so as to lock the relative phase between the signal and the
LO at pi/2. So, he is actually measuring the P quadrature at
this port. At the other output port, he uses QWP to induce a
pi/2 phase shift between the signal and the LO, and he makes a
homodyne detection to measure the X quadrature. We design a
broadband balanced detector with a photodiode G8376-05 by
Hamamatsu. The effective bandwidth is over 100 MHz, and
the SNR is near 9.2 dB for 20-mW coherent light as shown
in Fig. 3. The outputs of detectors are mixed with a 50-MHz
carrier and filtered by 25-MHz LPFs. The outputs of filters
are sampled by a data acquisition card NI PXIe-5122, and the
sampling rate is 50 MHz.
B. MODULATION AND NOISE SUPPRESSION
In our experiment, the signal is not a weak coherent state
but has a large offset. When the signal and the LO’s phase is
locked, the initial state can be written as |x0〉, while the mod-
ulated state can be written as |x0 + x + ip〉, where x and p are
the signals added to the X and P quadratures of the light re-
spectively. If x, p ≪ x0, amplitude A and phase θ of the mod-
ulated light are
A =
√
(x0 + x)2 + p2 ≈ x0 + x,
θ = arctan (p/(x + x0)) ≈ p/x0. (25)
So, when Alice modulates the amplitude and the phase of the
light, she is just modulating the X and P quadratures of the
light, respectively. The half-wave voltage of the amplitude
and the phase modulators is 360V, while the electronic signals
Alice adds to them are less than 2 V, so the condition x, p ≪ x0
is satisfied.
The light generated by the fiber laser, which has much
relative intensity noise and phase noise in our exper-
iment, can be treated as a coherent state whose am-
plitude and phase are randomly modulated. It is not
a pure state but a mixed state and can be written
as ρ =
∫
P(nA, nP) |α(nA, nP)〉 〈α(nA, nP)| dnAdnP, where
|α(nA, nP)〉 =
∣∣∣(x0 + nA) einP〉. This can be regarded as the
fact that the source generates a pure state |α(nA, nP)〉 with the
probability P(nA, nP). So for a particular state, we treat it as
a coherent state |α (nA, nP)〉, but the parameters nA and nP are
unknown. When Alice modulates its amplitude and phase by
x and p/x0, respectively, it becomes
∣∣∣(x0 + nA + x) ei(nP+p/x0)〉
and can be written as
∣∣∣(x0 + nA + x + ip) einP〉 when x, p ≪ x0.
The LO can be written as
∣∣∣αLOei(ϕ+nP)〉, where αLO is a real
number, α2LO is the intensity of the LO, and ϕ is the phase
shift added by Bob. The LO is quite strong, so its amplitude
noise can be ignored, and it has the same phase noise nP with
the signal when their optical path difference is far less than the
coherence length, since they come from one beam. In homo-
dyne detection, the difference of photoelectrons generated by
two photodiodes satisfies [20]
∆Ne ∝ αLO (cosϕxˆ + sinϕpˆ) . (26)
From Eq. (26), we can see that the phase noise in the
laser source has no effect on the results of the P quadrature
measurement, since the phase noise nP does not appear in
Eq. (26). This is consistent with our experimental results.
Whether the mode cleaner is added or not, the noise on the P
quadrature can reach the shot-noise limit. However, matters
are quite different with the X quadrature. When we measure
the noise of the X quadrature without the mode cleaner, there
is a very sizable classical noise with a sideband frequency up
5FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) The noise spectrum (0-100 MHz) of the
X quadrature measurement of the signal without cavity (the highest
curve), shot noise (the middle curve), and electronics noise (the low-
est curve). (b) The noise spectrum (0-30 MHz) of the X quadrature
measurement of the signal with cavity (the highest curve), shot noise
(the middle curve), and electronics noise (the lowest curve).
to 50 MHz, as shown in Fig. 3(a). So, Alice uses a mode
cleaner to purify the noisy coherent state. After purification,
the amplitude noise above 10 MHz is remarkably suppressed
and almost reaches the shot-noise limit, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
Although the high-frequency noise above 10 MHz has been
suppressed, there is still much residual low-frequency noise
under 10 MHz. In order to avoid this noise, Alice uses two
strings of random numbers that she wants to send to mix with
a 50-MHz carrier. Then, she modulates the two mixed elec-
tronic signals to the amplitude and phase modulators, respec-
tively. Bob can filter the low frequency noise easily and can
pick up the interested frequency component by using a mixer
and an LPF. Finally, the noise in the source is suppressed to
the shot-noise limit and can be neglected. The relative phase
between the signal and the LO is locked, so the phase noise of
the interferometer is small enough to be ignored. In Gaussian-
modulation-based protocols, the modulation variance is large,
so it will induce notable excess noise [9]. However, in our
experiment, the modulation variance is quite small (see the
following), and the noise caused by the imperfect modulation
can be ignored.
C. DATA PROCESSING
In order to get the measurement results of X and P quadra-
tures of the nth coherent state, Bob needs to get the nth differ-
ence of photoelectrons∆Nen. Since the width of each coherent
state is T = 100ns, we obtain
∆Nen ∝
∫ nT
(n−1)T
V(t)dt, (27)
FIG. 4: log10 |S i| as a function of i.
where V(t) is the output of the LPF. In practice, Bob does
not integrate V(t), instead he samples it at ti = iτ and gets Vi
(i = 0, 1, 2, · · ·), where τ = 20ns is the sampling interval, and
Vi is the sampling value. The bandwidth of V(t) is less than
25MHz, so Bob can get all of the information of V(t) with
the sampling rate of 50MHz. Bob can rebuild V(t) with his
samples [24]
V(t) =
∞∑
i=−∞
Visinc
( t
τ
− i
)
, (28)
so
∆Nen ∝
∫ 5nτ
5(n−1)τ
∞∑
i=−∞
Visinc
(
t
τ
− i
)
dt
=
∞∑
i=−∞
Vi
∫ (5n−i)τ
(5n−i−5)τ sinc
(
t
τ
)
dt =
∞∑
i=−∞
ViS i−5n+5,
(29)
where S i =
∫ (5−i)τ
−iτ sinc(t/τ)dt is symmetric with i = 2.5. By
considering that the absolute value of S i attenuates quickly
with the absolute value of i − 2.5, as shown in Fig. 4, in prac-
tice, the sum in Eq. (29) is truncated from i = 0 to i = 5. So,
the measurement result of the nth coherent state (take the X
quadrature for instance) is
Xn ≈ k
5∑
i=0
V5n+i−5S i, (30)
where the constant k contains all the dimensional prefactors.
Thus, Bob approximately obtains the total difference of
photoelectrons when he measures the received signal with this
method. If Eve attacks by measuring the signal during time
windows which are not sampled by Bob, she can not do it
without being discovered, because she will inevitably the to-
tal difference of photoelectrons obtained by Bob. Actually, if
Eve uses this attack, she will increase the loss observed by
Bob. So, the proposed protocol is secure against this attack.
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The homodyne detectors are carefully calibrated, and their
efficiencies are both η = 0.8. Then we need to determine the
6FIG. 5: The result of Bob’s heterodyne measurement when the mod-
ulation variance is 18.
FIG. 6: The secret key rate as a function of the modulation variance
for an electronic noise of 0.12 (solid line), 0 (dashed line), and 1.2
(dotted line). The channel is noiseless, and its transmittance is 0.1;
the efficiency of the detector is 0.8, and the reconciliation efficiency
is 0.8.
excess noise in Bob’s homodyne detector. We just simulate
the channel loss by using a beam splitter on a tabletop, so the
channel’s excess noise ε is 0. When the channel’s transmit-
tance is T = 1 and the modulation variance is 18, the result
Bob gets is shown in Fig. 5. There are 50000 points in this
figure. From the data, we can calculate the excess noise in the
detectors. The total added noise is determined experimentally
to be about χt = 1.8. Since T = 1, ε = 0 and η = 0.8, from Eq.
(14) we obtain υ = 0.12. According to Eq. (2), we can find the
maximal secret key rate by scanning the modulation variance
Va, as shown in Fig. 6. As a result, for a 90% lossy channel
and the reconciliation efficiency of 80%, when the modula-
tion variance is 0.29, we achieve the maximal secret key rate
of 46.8 kbits/s at the encoding rate of 10 MHz.
We can also see that even if the electronic noise is sup-
pressed at 0, the optimal secret key rate per coherent state is
just 5.02 × 10−3 bits, which is only a little bit higher than that
in our experiment. So, it is not very wise to enhance the secret
key rate by suppressing the electronic noise of the detectors.
In our experiment, the encoding rate is limited by the band-
width of the detectors, which is 100M. The secret key rate can
be further enhanced by increasing the encoding rate, which
needs a broader bandwidth detector and will lead to higher
electronic noise. For detectors with a certain gain-bandwidth
product, if we broaden the bandwidth B to
√
10B, the gain G
becomes 10−0.5G, which leads to a electronic noise of 1.2. In
this case, the optimal secret key rate is 2.43 × 10−3bits/state,
and the secret key rate per second is 1.64 times as before. So,
we can enhance the secret key rate by decreasing the gain of
the detectors so as to broaden their bandwidth and to increase
the encoding rate.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we derive a lower bound to the secret key
rate when considering the noise in the source, and we present
a discretely modulated CV-QKD system by using strong co-
herent states and heterodyne detection. We assume that the
noise in the source is induced by a neutral person Fred, and
we present the equivalent entanglement-based scheme. In this
scheme, Eve can not purify the state shared by Alice and Bob,
so we can not calculate the secret key rate. Instead, we derive
a lower bound for the secret key rate. In our experiment, the
noise of the laser is suppressed at the shot-noise limit by using
a cavity and the method of frequency shift. Since the modula-
tion variance is quite small and the relative phase between the
signal and the LO is locked to perform heterodyne detection,
the excess noise induced by the imperfection of modulation
and the phase noise in the interferometer is negligible. In or-
der to increase the repetition rate, we broaden the bandwidth
of the detector at the expense of low SNR. When the chan-
nel loss is 90%, we achieve a secret key rate of 46.8 kbits/s
with the optimal modulation variance and the encoding rate
of 10 MHz. For detectors with a certain gain-bandwidth prod-
uct, the secret key rate can further be improved by broaden-
ing the bandwidth of detectors and by increasing the encoding
rate. However, the secret key rate is only an estimation and is
not a real one. Many actions must be conducted, such as er-
ror correction, privacy amplification, and reduction of guided
acoustic-wave Brillouin scattering in fiber-optic implementa-
tions, which are what we will perform in a future work.
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